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ABSTRACT Over the past 30 years rapid advances in the realm of digital
technology and the establishment of an ever expanding globally networked
communications infrastructure have radically altered the infrastructure of the
global economy. Combined with new rules for international finance, the de-
regulation of capital and labour markets and the embracing of a ‘free trade’
ethos by most states in the international system, today’s ‘information age’ bears
little resemblance to the economic world experienced by previous generations.
Rapid economic changes have been accompanied by the broad dissemination of
social, cultural and political information to all corners of the globe, a
phenomenon that has contributed to a number of important socio-political
developments. Using social movement theory to frame our analytical narrative,
we investigate how the demands and pressures of globalisation have helped
to foment ‘Balik Islam’, a religious-based social movement concentrated
among the ranks of returned overseas Filipino workers in the northern island of
Luzon. These workers, having converted from Catholicism to Islam while
employed in the Middle East, are beginning to reshape the political fabric of
the Republic of the Philippines, sometimes in a violent fashion. To illustrate
the possible extremes of Balik Islam, the article will chart the rise and fall
of the Rajah Solaiman Movement, a Balik-Islam group that was responsible
for a number of recent terrorist attacks, and whose members, thanks to their
ability to blend in with the dominant population, pose a special challenge to
democracy.
For as long as we have stood erect, humans have walked, ridden, sledded,
skied, skated or paddled from place to place on this planet. Indeed, for most
of our comparably short history, a core theme has been that of humans
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conquering the challenges of nature. In the telling of this story, humans have
‘moved on’ and conquered until we could move and conquer no more, only
ceasing our entropic diasporas when restrained by physical limits. When we
dared venture beyond technology’s reach to cope with physical extremes, the
extremes of nature have killed us. However, the ubiquitous ‘fear of death’
that has tempered our adventures into the unknown has been continually
counterbalanced by our seemingly insatiable desire to conquer space, place,
time and, more importantly for the subject matter of this contribution, each
other. During these migrations humans have transported material items in
the form of food, clothing, weapons, tools, trade goods and talismans;
biological elements in the form of microbes, pollen, viruses (and the
variations of our own DNA); and, last but not least, our divergent ‘cultures’ in
the form of knowledge, ideals, learned behaviours, and shared activity
patterns. Eventually, with the coming of ‘modernity’ in the industrial and
post-industrial ages of the 19th and 20th centuries, many of the historic
physical obstacles were greatly reduced, if not entirely eliminated. Thinking
temporally, the changes we have wrought are breathtaking, but are not
without contradictions. Indeed, in less than the lifespan of a giant tortoise,
humans have gone from travelling on land via ox-power—and crossing the
oceans under sail—to safely landing on the Moon. As such, during the first
decade of the 21st century, humanity has now shifted from one of survival
against the elements to one of survival against each other. Certainly it is true
that some migrants (for instance those crossing the US–Mexican border in
the desolate Arizona desert) still die when attempting to find peace, solace or
a job in another country. But it is also the case that migrants today arrive
safely at their planned destination by means of a pleasant (and often perfectly
legal) ride in a plane, ship, train, bus or car. More noteworthy, perhaps, is the
observation of how the rendering moot of physical obstacles by means of
increasingly safe, cheap and widely available transport has been paralleled by
correspondingly rapid increases in the diffusion of cultures across political
and geographic boundaries. It is the rapid diffusion of cultures, in
combination with the emancipation of information via the internet, that
has generated new forms of cross-culture co-operation, as well as violence.
Our focus in this contribution is on the latter. While we recognise that cross-
cultural discord and violence have always been part of human migrations
over the ages, and that today’s ‘clash of civilisations’1 is a challenge for
almost all regime types, we argue that today’s new forms of political violence
pose a qualitatively unique challenge to liberal democratic societies. For the
purposes of the point we want to emphasise here, we are not engaging
the causes of migration, although we recognise that, even in this example, the
migrants are primarily those who are economically vulnerable and thus take
up positions to work (mostly) as labourers in the Middle East.
Drawing on social movement theory (as originally formulated by Doug
McAdam and refined by others2) to inform our analysis, we investigate how
the demands and pressures of globalisation have helped to foment ‘Balik
Islam’, a religious-based social movement concentrated among the ranks of
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returned overseas Filipino workers in the northern island of Luzon. These
workers, having converted from Catholicism to Islam while employed in the
Middle East, are beginning to reshape the political fabric of the Republic of
the Philippines, sometimes in a violent fashion. To illustrate the possible
extremes of Balik Islam, this contribution will chart the rise and fall of the
Rajah Solaiman Movement (RSM), a group responsible for a number of
horrific terrorist attacks which, starting possibly as early as 2003, have killed,
maimed or injured hundreds of Filipinos. Our study of this group reveals that
today’s globalised world creates a set of circumstances, opportunities and
challenges that creates significant new security problems for the govern-
mental representatives of democratic states.
Historical background
After 11 September 2001 a renewed focus on international terrorism exposed
an interesting and new socio-religious development that had been on the rise
incognito within many parts of the world. Small groups of individuals,
having converted to some of the most conservative or fundamentalist forms
of Islam, had become the leading agents in planning and executing terrorist
acts.3 The RSM in the Philippines has emerged as part of this violent segment
of today’s radical Islam. RSM arose out of the ranks of different organisations
within the Balik Islam Movement (BIM), which is one of the fastest growing
social movements in the Philippines today.4 Adherents to Balik Islam, or
‘revert to Islam’, are a loose conglomeration of Filipino former Christians
who believe that the Philippines was a Muslim country before Western
colonisation, and that all Filipinos need to ‘revert’ back to their original
faith.5 Although the broader-based BIM served to greatly facilitate RSM’s
emergence, the latter represents only a very small portion of BIM members,
most of whom promote the peaceful creation of an autonomous Islamic
homeland on the island of Luzon—which is the geographic seat of power in
the Philippines. As self-described ‘radicals’ in their Islamic preferences,
members of RSM have strong ties with the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the regional terrorist group Jemaah
Islamiah (JI) and various other international terrorist groups (such as al-
Qaeda), from which it has received funding. Because of this transnational
quality, some Philippine security experts consider RSM to be one of the most
serious threats to the Philippines.6
RSM (also known as RSIM—or the Rajah Solaiman Islamic Movement) was
founded by Ahmed Santos, who was born Hilarion Del Rosario Santos III,
on 12 March 1971 in Anda, Pangasinan in the northern Philippines. He is the
eldest of three brothers who, according to Santos, were all raised as ‘hard-
core Roman Catholics’ by their grandfather,7 a former military officer.8 After
completing high school and working through a short computer course in
Manila, the young and impressionable Santos, being inspired by their heroic
imagery and reputation for fighting prowess, attempted to join the US
Marines.9 After failing to obtain an enlistment, and dissatisfied by his
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economic prospects in Manila, Santos joined the Philippines Overseas
Foreign Worker (OFW) programme, through which he found work in Saudi
Arabia. The OFW programme is a key conduit of globalisation in the
Philippines today. It grew substantially after 1974 when Philippine President
Ferdinand Marcos enacted a new labour code that allowed a considerable
increase in the number of Filipino workers permitted to work in the Middle
East. By the end of 2001 there were 915 239 Filipinos in Saudi Arabia and 1.5
million throughout the Middle East.10 In 2003 the Middle East continued to
be the top destination for land-based Filipino contract workers, accounting
for 32% of the total number of OFWs.11 According to Santos, Saudi firms
who hire OFWs conduct a ‘pre-departure’ briefing for incoming workers that
includes an initial indoctrination about Islam.
From 1992 to 1993 Santos worked for Alkhatan, a contractor of Aramco,
in the eastern province of Saudi Arabia. In 1992, while tiredly walking down
a hot dusty road, Santos hitched an air-conditioned ride with a Wahhabist
preacher, and ‘within three hours of conversation’ had decided to convert to
the Islamic faith.12 After his conversion, he spent two years, from 1993 to
1995, undergoing an educational orientation to Islam. During his studies he
met Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, the brother-in-law of Osama Bin Laden,
who was responsible for establishing al-Qaeda networks within the
Philippines.13
In 1995 Santos formed the Fi Sabillah Dawah (roughly translated, ‘inviting
people to the cause of Allah’) and Media Foundation, Inc (FSDMFI) to
propagate ‘the true essence of Islam and to correct the misconception about
Islam and Muslims’.14 Santos broadcast his message through a weekly radio
programme and by screening film clips depicting the mistreatment of
Muslims throughout the world.15 Santos’s proselytising radio programme
also helped him establish contacts with the leaders of the MILF, one of
the main Islamic insurgent groups on the strategic southern island of
Mindanao.16
In 1999 Ahmed Santos complete the Haj (a pilgrimage to Mecca and one
of the five pillars of Islam) and upon his return to Manila joined the group
Islamic Studies Call and Guidance (ISCAG), which is a legal organisation that
solicits funds and donations from the Middle East to purchase religious
publications and other materials for missionary work.17 According to
Professor Rommel Banlaoi, the leading Philippine scholar studying radical
Islam, the idea of organising RSM was probably ‘conceptualized at the
FSDMFI Office at Cubao, Quezon City during 2000 and 2001 in order to have
a legitimate [cover] organization’, and the ‘core members of the FSDMFI were
the individuals who formed the core membership of the RSIM’.18 Taking a
position far beyond many other groups in the Balik Islam Movement, RSM
was founded with the main objective of converting the whole of the
Philippines to Islam, arguing that the Philippines was once a Muslim country
before Spanish colonisation.19 RSM was named in honour of Rajah Solaiman,
a Filipino Muslim who ruled the Manila area before the Spanish conquest in
the 15th century. Solaiman was reportedly a grandson of the Sultan of Brunei
and a scion of the Bornean dynasty.20
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Santos’s marriage to his second wife, Nurain Dongon, established a
familial link between RSM and the Abu Sayyaf (‘bearer of the sword’) Group
(ASG), one of the Philippines’ most notorious militant Islamist separatist
groups.21 One of Nurain’s three sisters is married to Kadafi Janjalani, ASG’s
leader at the time, while the other sister is married to Jainal Sali, ASG’s
second-in-command. Santos also developed a support network outside the
Philippines. He went on a pilgrimage to Mecca in March 1999 and worked
with the Islamic Wisdom Worldwide Mission (IWWM). His contacts among
different organisations established through his relationship with Mohammed
Jamal Khalifa (bin Laden’s brother-in-law), Santos gained access to funds
for the expansion of his activities in the Philippines.22
In 2001 Ruben Lavilla, an Ilongo (Filipino ethnic group from the central
Philippines), joined Santos and became RSM’s spiritual adviser. Lavilla, who
earned a degree in chemical engineering from the University of the
Philippines, is also a graduate of the University of Medina, where he
specialised in Islamic jurisprudence, trained with Kadafi Janjalani at the
Darul Imam Shafi’ie Academy in Marawi City in 1992, and established
connections in Saudi Arabia and in other countries in the Middle East.23
Santos claims to have initially met Lavilla at the Indonesian embassy in
Makati City during a prayer session. After their initial meeting Santos invited
Lavilla to produce lectures for Santos’ radio programme and to lead studies
in Anda, Pangasinan.24 Santos describes Lavilla as ‘well-educated, persua-
sive, and a very intelligent man’.25 He is considered a strong advocate of
Wahhabism (the conservative Saudi doctrine of Islam) and is believed to have
taken part in the Chechen jihad. He is also the former president of the ISCAG
in Cavite, a city on the southern shores of Manila Bay.26 Lavilla served as the
conduit of funds from the organisations in the Middle East, and is known as
a mufti, an Islamic scholar who can interpret Shariah, or the Islamic laws,
and issue verdicts.27
The existence of RSM was first uncovered in 2002 after police executed a
series of operations in the province of Pangasinan, although as early as
December 2001 Philippine police were receiving reports on a new group of
individuals conducting meetings in a remote village of Mal-Ong, in Santos’s
home town of Anda. Follow-up police operations revealed the presence of a
madrassa (an Islamic school), which operated as a training area for radical
Islamic teachings as well as an evening meeting place for members.28 On 1
May 2002 a shooting incident occurred in the village of San Nicolas in Tarlac
City between Philippine National Police (PNP) elements and two armed men
who police later identified as Islamic converts. Police killed one (Khalid
Trinidad) and captured the other (Dexter Payumo), who confirmed the
presence of a training camp for militant Islamic converts on Santos’s
property in Anda. Based on information provided by Payumo, Philippine
authorities raided the compound on 1 May 2002, arresting six people
and recovering firearms, training and bomb-making materials and docu-
ments directly linking the group to the MILF.29 This evidence allowed police
to conduct follow-up operations that would later reveal the existence of
RSM.30
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Theoretical considerations
For our purposes here it is helpful to understand RSM’s emergence in terms of
social movement theory. Many assume that social movements emerge when
individuals become angry enough about some social condition that they
organise in order to bring about change. While there is certainly an element
of truth in this assumption, in most societies there are plenty of individuals
dissatisfied with the status quo, but few become activists or form a social
movement.31 Instead, other factors need to fall into place before a social
movement can form. The model of social movement emergence that we draw
on is Doug McAdam’s ‘political process model’.32 This model takes into
account the opportunities that shape the actions of social movements, the
variables internal to movements (such as organisation, commitment,
responsibility, beliefs and values) but also the external constraints upon
their emergence.33 McAdam posits that, in order for a movement to
successfully mobilise, not only do people need to harbour grievances of some
kind, but they also 1) need to recognise that they share their grievances with
others and that together they can do something about them (ie development of
an insurgent consciousness); 2) need to have access to enough internal
resources (wealth, potential members, leaders, meeting places, etc) in order to
mobilise on their own without having to rely on external funding (ie increase
in indigenous organisational strength); and 3) the broader political environ-
ment needs to become ‘open’ to social movement formation (ie expansion of
political opportunities). McAdam’s political process model is illustrated in
Figure 1.
In isolation none of the factors identified above is sufficient to generate and
sustain a social movement. When they converge, however, a social move-
ment’s emergence becomes more likely. Specifically, when expanding political
opportunities interact with strong indigenous organisations, they provide
potential insurgents with the ‘structural potential’ for collective action; this
interaction can lead to the development of an insurgent consciousness which,
in turn, can transform the movement’s ‘structural potential’ into an actual
insurgency if sufficient resources are available.34 What is more, a single event
FIGURE 1. Doug McAdam’s political process model of movement emergence.
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can affect more than one factor. For instance, the collapse of the cotton
industry in the southern USA not only created political opportunities for
southern Blacks, but it led to an increase in the resources available to them as
increasing numbers moved from rural to urban settings and took up higher-
paying employment.35
Expanding political opportunities: grievances, instability and ideology
Minority populations generally face numerous challenges in attempting to
bring about societal change, and opportunities for overcoming such
challenges are rare and tend to fluctuate over time. Indeed, only when such
opportunities expand to a significant degree can budding social movements
have any hope of mobilising successfully. What factors lead to the expansion
of such opportunities? According to McAdam,
Any event or broad social process that serves to undermine the calculations and
assumptions on which the political establishment is structured occasions a shift
in political opportunities. Among the events and processes likely to prove
disruptive of the political status quo are wars, industrialization, international
political realignments, prolonged unemployment, and widespread demographic
changes.36
Expanding political opportunities manifest themselves in three broad
forms: 1) ‘political instability’; 2) ‘enhanced political positions of the
aggrieved populations’; and 3) ‘ideological openness’.37
Political instability occurs when elite control of the existing power
structure weakens. Of course, such circumstances reflect a crisis of legitimacy
of a given social and political order. In order to maintain the status quo,
dominant groups must expend their political capital and resources to counter
movements which are attempting to exploit the instability.38 Short-duration
events, such as economic crises, armed conflict and traumatic world events
(war, pestilence, drought, tsunami, earthquake, etc), can rattle the existing
political structure and raise the possibility of policy reforms that benefit
aggrieved populations.39 A relative increase in the political position (ie
power) of aggrieved populations can result from broad social changes that
occur over extended periods of time. Successful insurgencies typically do not
emerge merely because of widespread political instability, but also because of
broad social processes that have strengthened the aggrieved population’s
political power.40 ‘Consequently, the increase in political opportunity
through enhanced political positions for movement groups is usually
achieved more gradually than through political instability.’41 Finally, broad
social changes can lead the social environment to tolerate alternative, critical
and even subversive ideas and world-views espoused by the aggrieved
population and other associated movements.42 ‘Since the exercise of power is
often closely linked to the manipulation of ideas, the expansion of freedom of
thought and expression combined with an influx of creative, critical ideas
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may result in a marked increase in political opportunity for potential
movement groups.’43
What needs to be emphasised here is that the relative expansion of political
opportunities is what matters. For instance, in the USA in 1955 the political
opportunities available to African Americans in the former Confederate
States were limited, but compared with the opportunities available to them in
1930, their opportunities had expanded considerably.44 Nevertheless, we need
to be cautious in our use and identification of ‘political opportunities’ with
regard to RSM. As Gamson and Meyer have warned, ‘the concept of political
opportunity structure is in trouble . . . It threatens to become an all-
encompassing fudge factor for all the conditions and circumstances that
form the context for collective activism. Used to explain much, it may
ultimately explain nothing at all.’45 Hence, when it comes to identifying the
political opportunities available to RSM, we need to show how specific
changes in the external environment (ie external to RSM) provided Santos and
his band of followers the opportunity to mobilise.
The Moro conflict: students and insurgents
The rise of student activism and the political awakening of student sectors in
major colleges and universities in the early 1970s helped contribute to the
Philippine government’s political instability, thereby expanding the political
opportunities available to various Muslim secessionist movements in the
Philippines. As urbanisation dramatically increased, student activism
emerged in the metro area. At the same time international events abroad
showcased students influencing their local governments. The University of
the Philippines, one of the leading educational institutions in the country,
became the birthplace of the Muslim secessionist movement ideology. Nur
Misuari, a young Muslim professor from the university, organised the Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF) as an ‘instrument for the liberation of the
Moro nation’.46 Indeed, Misuari became a symbol for the ‘free and
independent state of the Bangsa Moro people in Mindanao’.47 Inspired by
both the Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM) of the late 1960s and the
1968 ‘Jabidah Massacre’,48 Filipino Muslims engaged in student activism and
other major protest actions against the government.49 The ideological
foundations of other prominent Muslim scholars, such as Hashim Salamat
(who later founded the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, and whose teachings
became the basis of RSM’s neo-fundamentalist ideology), were formed through
their educational experiences in the Middle East.50
Looking at the foundation of the MNLF rebellion, religious differences have
partly shaped the conflict. However, the rebellion is also rooted in the clash
of interests over land and other natural resources, as well as the identity
issues surrounding the second-class status perceived by much of the Moro
population.51 The MNLF was a nationalist movement modelled after other
anti-colonial resistance organisations that were common in many parts of the
Third World in the 1960s (the FLN in Algeria, the PLO, etc). The MNLF aimed
to mobilise the general Moro support as the base for the recruitment, training
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and equipping of armed cadres to resist Philippine imperial government.
Having obtained international support for the justness of its cause, the MNLF
organised itself with the ultimate aim of achieving Moro political
independence from the Philippines.52 The event that served as the tipping
point for the formation of the MNLF was the so-called ‘Jabidah massacre’ of
Muslim conscript soldiers on the island of Corregidor in March 1968. The
Moro soldiers at that time were being trained to conduct covert military
operations in Sabah, (a province of Malaysia since 1963) upon which the
Philippines maintains a historic claim. Upon learning the purpose of their
training, the soldiers mutinied, but were killed in cold blood to ensure
their silence.53
The escalation of the Mindanao conflict was precipitated by two events in
1971 and 1972 that resulted in full-scale war between the MNLF and the
government of the Philippines. First, the Muslim representatives were swept
from office during the congressional elections held in November 1971. The
growing insecurity in Mindanao led many Christians who had previously
voted for Muslim candidates as a guarantee of their security now to express
their lack of confidence in the Muslim datus by voting for Christian
candidates. As a result, political power in areas that historically had been
part of the sultanates shifted from Muslims to Christians.54
Second, President Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law throughout the
Philippines. From the perspective of many Muslims the declaration was a
catalyst for the Moro rebellion. It was perceived as a declaration of war
against a defeated people who now had no option except that of resistance.55
Eventually the war on Mindanao de-escalated upon the intercession of the
Organization of the Islamic Conference (led by Libya), which helped bring
about a ceasefire and then an autonomy agreement in Tripoli in December
1976.56 This accord provided for an immediate cessation of armed hostilities
between the two parties and established the framework for the eventual
establishment of today’s Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM).57
The MILF is a group that splintered from the MNLF following the latter’s
peace deal with Philippine government. Salamat Hashim, the founder of the
MILF, felt increasingly restrained by the MNLF’s founder Nur Misuari. At the
end of 1977 Salamat communicated to the Organization of the Islamic
Conference his desire to head the ‘New MNLF.’58 Salamat’s Islamic vision was
later energised in wake of his experiences in Pakistan between 1982 and 1987,
where he became involved with US and Saudi-funded efforts to recruit
jihadists from around the world to fight against the Soviet Army’s
occupation Afghanistan. Administered in part by Osama bin Ladin, this
global jihadist programme is said to have brought 35 000 potential fighters
from different Muslim countries. The Philippine contribution of about 500 to
700 fighters was organised and co-ordinated by Hashim Salamat.59
In 1984 Salamat officially declared the establishment of the MILF. He
demanded independence and proclaimed that a Muslim state on Mindanao
would be based on conservative Koranic principles. By the 1990s the MILF
had achieved a military strength of about 10 000–30 000 combatants who
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were spread across seven provinces in Mindanao. It operated large base
camps and provided basic government services in its areas of operations, all
the while conducting attacks on the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
and planting bombs in Mindanao cities. Despite numerous conflict resolution
events and agreements over the past two decades, peace still eludes Mindanao
in 2008.60
The Philippine economy and peace talks
A softening in the Philippine economy that began in the 1970s and
continued into the mid-1980s helped fuel (and continues to fuel) political
unrest, not only in Mindanao, but also in urban centres across the
country.61 In response to economic deprivation, many Filipinos, including
Muslims from Mindanao, migrated from rural areas to major urban
centres, leading to further increases in the unemployment rate and political
unrest. Other economic conditions, such as the perceived hegemony of
elites in major economic infrastructures, the unequal distribution of wealth
and the exploitation of resources, contributed to this situation as well.
Organisations drew their leaders from the ranks of these discontented
Filipinos, including figures within the various BIM organisations and BIM’s
radical RSM offshoot.
The ongoing peace talks between the MILF and the Philippine government
has led the MILF to distance itself from JI over the past five years. It has
apparently ceased harbouring foreign terrorists (eg members of JI and other
Indonesian groups, such as that of bomb-maker Noordin Top) and, while it
did not explicitly endorse Philippine air strikes against suspected JI hideouts,
it did not strongly condemn them either.62 This has led groups such as JI to
find other ‘partners’ such as ASG and RSM. RSM, with its location in the
northern Philippines is particularly attractive to JI (and ASG) because after 30
years of warfare in the southern Philippines, attacks on civilians in the north
are seen as ‘righteous retribution’.63 Moreover, by ‘extending their reach into
the enemy’s true heartland, JI and ASG aim to project an image of ubiquity
and invincibility, seizing the offensive to distract and over-stretch security
forces while gaining greater publicity than attacks in the south would
produce’.64
Increase in indigenous organisational strength
Favourable changes in the political environment only increases the
probability that budding insurgent movements will be able to mobilise
successfully. Whether they actually do so or not also depends on whether
activists have access to the resources necessary to mobilise and sustain their
cause.65 Resources can include factors such as an increase in the education
and wealth within the aggrieved population or access to the wealth of
sympathetic (and often international) supporters. However, the most
important resource available to insurgent groups is strong, indigenous
organisations, because they contribute five key resources to a social
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movement: members, leaders, feelings of group solidarity, communication
networks and enterprise tools (places to meet, computers, telephones, etc).66
Again, we wish to emphasise the importance of the relative increase in
indigenous organisational strength rather than a movement’s absolute
strength. Using the Civil Rights Movement once more as an example, in
1955 southern African Americans were not nearly as well off in terms of
levels of education, community wealth and institutional strength as were
southern Whites; nevertheless, compared with their situation 25 years before,
African Americans had made considerable gains in these areas, thus setting
the stage for the movement to emerge.67
As the following discussion illustrates, the Balik Islam Movement, the
Overseas Filipino Workers programme and international financial support
all contributed to RSM’s rise, providing it with a pool of potential recruits, the
training and education of future leaders, the creation of a sense of solidarity,
social (communication) networks that facilitated the diffusion of the
movement’s ideology, and the resources (eg funds) necessary to engage in
contentious activity.
The Balik Islam Movement
For a variety of reasons religion’s organisational aspect is ideal for mobilising
groups and individuals around shared ideological goals. One reason is
because organised religion provides numerous resources necessary for
collective action, such as mass membership, leadership and places to meet.68
Another is that since a movement’s ideology is subject to the same pattern of
diffusion and adoption as are other innovations, a religious group’s pre-
existing social networks provide a means for an insurgency to propagate its
message to potential recruits.69 Finally, and perhaps most importantly,
religious organisations can provide the cognitive and emotional incentives to
overcome the ‘free rider’ problem70 that most social movements face.71 It is
one thing to believe that a philosophy is calling on you to act; it is quite
another to believe that it is God commanding action to prove one’s faith.
‘Perhaps the most potent motivational leverage that a social movement can
enjoy is the alignment of its cause with the ultimacy and sacredness
associated with God’s will, eternal truth, and the absolute moral structure of
the universe.’72
Thus, it is not surprising that the emergence of BIM was instrumental in
RSM’s rise. RSM emerged from the BIM, which began in the 1970s and now
reportedly has over 200 000 Christian converts to the Islamic faith. Members
prefer to be called ‘reverts’ instead of ‘converts’ because of their belief that
the Philippines was originally a Muslim country before Western colonisation
in the 15th century.73 Aminkadra Undog notes, ‘The first documented
activity of ‘‘Balik-Islam’’ which has contributed to the prominence of the BIM
is that of Hadji Akmad del Rio, an Ilocano who migrated to General Santos
in Mindanao’.74 After his conversion to Islam in 1981, Akmad del Rio
organised a movement that solicited funds from Middle Eastern organisa-
tions such as the Saudi Arabian Islamic Missionary Council.75
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The fact that BIM has grown to become the seventh largest Muslim group
in the Philippines76 not only provided RSM with a pool of potential recruits
(and the network of ties between them), but also gave it a training ground for
future leaders through the mosques, madrassas and pesantren (rural Islamic
boarding schools) explicitly or implicitly related to the movement.77 Ahmed
Santos, for instance, ran a madrassa in Pangasian, a province in central
Luzon,78 and he is a former member of ISCAG, a legal BIM organisation
established in 1991 with the stated objective of soliciting Saudi donations for
charitable institutions in the Philippines.79 In addition, several prominent
RSM members came from legitimate BIM organisations scattered throughout
the country, such as the Balik-Islam Unity Congress (BIUC) and the Islamic
Information Center (IIC).80 Finally, BIM has drawn on RSM’s relatively
developed ideology in order to bind members tightly together with feelings of
group solidarity and mission.
Overseas Foreign Workers programme
Not only did the weak Philippine economy lead to domestic political unrest,
it also motivated a large number of Filipino workers to travel to the Middle
East (Saudi Arabia in particular) through the OWF programme.81 Many of
them returned home as Islamic converts.82 Why did they convert? Both
Gilberto Teodoro Jr (the present Philippine Secretary of Defense) and Cesar
Garcia, (the present Director-General of the National Intelligence Co-
ordinating Agency) report that the majority convert out of simple
pragmatism: in Saudi Arabia and other countries in the Middle East all
Muslims have greater job security, higher pay and a more enhanced social
status than non-believers.83 However, both of these senior analysts observe
that Filipinos are very ‘spiritual’ by nature and, when exposed to Islamic
teachings while working in the Middle East, it would be natural for them to
feel drawn to the dominant faith. Other analysts and adherents have
suggested Filipinos convert out of a desire for community, to reduce
boredom, to counter loneliness, or simply to express faith.84 Undoubtedly an
increase in the ratio of Muslim to non-Muslim ties in day-to-day activities
played a crucial role in their conversion as well, since most conversions occur
through close, personal ties.85
Upon their return to the Philippines many if not most of these converts
‘reverted’ back to Catholicism. However, for others the conversion was
genuine, with many of these new Muslims helping to form (or later joined)
BIM and RSM. And it was through their globalised links to Saudi Arabia
that they were able to attract funding for the establishment of Islamic
schools in traditionally Christian areas of Luzon in the northern
Philippines.
Needless to say, the OFW programme’s 1.5 million workers provided BIM
and RSM with a large pool of potential recruits. Just as importantly, however,
BIMs routinely sent money they earned in the Middle East to family back
home in the Philippines. Such remittances, which constituted one of the goals
sought after by the Philippine government in reforming its labour policies,
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have increased in recent years, and totalled over US$2.1billion in 2007.86
These monies have undoubtedly proven to be a valuable internal resource on
which all groups, including RSM, could draw. Indeed, given the poor state of
the Philippine economy, these remittances represent a relative increase in
power among OFWs and their families compared to other non-OFWs and their
families. These Islamic families and their charitable organisations are also
attractive recipient for funds from Middle East groups and organisations
looking for appropriate recipients of zakat (the traditional Muslim tithing
system, and one of the five pillars of Islam).
International linkages and support for RSM
Substantial zakat-generated financial support for RSM has come
from Saudi-affiliated individuals and organisations, such as the Interna-
tional Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), which was the primary Muslim
NGO that provided support to Muslim organisations in the Philippines from
1995 until its closure in 2001. Osama bin Laden’s brother-in-law,
Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, who headed the IIRO, established several
organisations in the Philippines, including the Al-Makdum University in
Zamboanga, which provided student scholarships and charitable support to
displaced Muslims. Unfortunately, in addition to these legitimate activities,
the IIRO also channelled funding to terrorist groups operating within the
Philippines.87
RSM also relied on its international linkages to expand its influence and
organisation. General Rodolfo ‘Boogie’ Mendoza, a high-ranking official in
the Philippine National Police, reports that RSM has more ties to different
Middle East organisations than any other Filipino terrorist group.88 Ahmed
Santos, for example, had established links with ASG and MILF; which both
advocate an independent Islamic state of the Southern Philippines; JI, which
functions as al-Qaeda’s representative in Southeast Asia; and with various
Islamic NGOs in the Middle East for training and financial support. These ties
have proved to be beneficial. For example, ASG leader Khadafy Janjalani
reportedly gave RSM the equivalent of around $200 000 in order to jump
start its operations in Manila,89 and the MILF and ASG have provided RSM
with training and other logistical elements necessary for the growth of the
organisation. Considering that most terrorist strikes in the Philippines
reportedly cost in the neighbourhood of $5 000 to finance,90 a $200 000
capital infusion goes a long way in providing sufficient resources for a group
to conduct operations.
Development of an insurgent consciousness
People who are content with the current political and social climate are
unlikely to form or participate in a movement to bring about social change.
Rather, a social movement draws people who are unhappy with or ‘excluded’
(perceived or real) from governance, ultimately reflecting a crisis of
legitimacy of a given democratic form. Nevertheless, discontent by itself
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does not produce social movements; there needs to be a transformation of
consciousness. People must recognise that they share these grievances with
others and believe that they can do something about them. Put simply, they
must experience some sort of cognitive realisation that change is not only
necessary, but also possible. Smith calls this transformation ‘the development
of an insurgent consciousness’, which is a ‘collective state of understanding’
that perceives, interprets and explains a social situation in such a way that it
compels people to organise and act in order to change the social situation.91
An incipient social movement cannot expect that all potential members will
be able to fully understand the group’s ideology, however. Thus, group elites
generally reduce their group’s core message to generalised ideological
snippets that are easily communicated to (and resonate with) potential
followers and the general public.92 Social movement theorists refer to this
reduction process as ‘framing’.93 What becomes important for us, then, is
identifying not only the grievances that helped give rise to RSM but also how
RSM’s leaders framed the movement’s ideology in ways that helped them
attract and retain followers.
The rise of Islamic converts and the RSM are a direct result of a people’s
desire to fight against the perceived neglect and oppression of Filipino
Muslims at the hands of the dominant Christian population. Four decades of
recent Moro conflict and centuries of struggle for self-determination helped
to create this ‘frame of injustice’, which has become an inspiration for
Philippine Islamic converts. RSM’s erstwhile northern Christians identify with
these southern Filipino Muslims, whom they see as victims of injustice,
oppression, government neglect and other social injustices inherent in the
Philippine political, social and economic environment. RSM’s resulting
insurgent consciousness was further reinforced by the sense of solidarity
arising out of conflicts in the Middle East, Iraq, Bosnia and other parts of the
world. For instance, the Director General of the National Intelligence
Coordinating Agency (NICA) notes that the ‘war in Iraq influenced the
radicalization of the Filipinos’.94
The Moro conflict
The decades-long Moro conflict in Mindanao provided the ideological basis
for the birth and growth of Islamic converts and RSM.95 Soliman Santos
describes the conflict as the ‘clash between two imagined nations or
nationalisms’ and identifies the Moro conflict’s features as: 1) economic
marginalisation; 2) political domination; 3) physical insecurity; 4) threatened
Moro and Islamic identity; 5) perception that the government is the principal
party to blame; and 6) perception of hopelessness under the present
establishment.96 In recruiting for RSM, Ahmed Santos capitalised on these
opportunities to ‘further his goal of propagating the true essence of Islam and
to correct misconceptions about Islam and Muslims’.97 Santos envisioned
first establishing an Islamic community on his own property in the northern
Philippines where, as at the MILF’s Camp Abu Bakar in Mindanao, Muslims
could practice the true teachings of Islam.98 He used his organisation
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(Fi Sabillah Dawah and Media Foundation, Inc) as a legal cover while
effectively using print and media outlets to promote Wahhabism, jihad and
Islamic purity.
The Moro conflict also helped established Santos’s and RSM’s link to
Muslim groups such as the MILF and the ASG.99 The alleged abuses
committed against Muslims in the Philippines and throughout the world
became the rallying point in recruitment and propagation of RSM’s Islamic
teachings. The issues of Christian domination of Muslim lands, the
exploitation of Mindanao’s natural resources by Christian and international
elites, and the lack of concern and representation in the central government
are major grievances that Santos formerly decried in propaganda efforts
aimed at attracting possible recruits in Luzon.
The RSM first established links with the MILF in 2000. Hashim Salamat, the
founder and former MILF chairman, reportedly provided financial and
logistical support to the RSM. Further, Salamat allowed RSM members to
train in bomb-making and other terrorist tactics with the JI in MILF camps at
their Mindanao bases. According to documents recovered by the Philippine
authorities, MILF Chairman Ahod Ibrahim, known as Al Haj Murad,
provided Santos with a certificate of endorsement on 7 April 2000 to solicit
funds for da’wah operations.100
After a raid on the RSM camp in Anda in 2002, Ahmed Santos advised RSM
members to hide in RSM–SOG (Special Operations Group) camps in
Mindanao.101 However, before this, Armed Forces Philippine (AFP) reports
state that Santos had already attended training in MILF camps. Evidence of
this was found in captured documents after an ‘all out war’ was launched by
AFP against the MILF in 2000. According to RSM documents and other
materials later seized by authorities from the facility at Anda and from the
FSDMFI offices in Quezon City, there were letters from the MILF Vice-
Chairman for Internal Affairs allocating support to the RSM. There were also
records of MILF and RSM personalities and transactions revealing that
captured MILF–SOG member Abdul Manap Mentang had links to Ahmed
Santos and to other RSM members.102
The RSM has also established links with the regional terrorist network,
JI. Santos and other RSM members joined the training conducted by the JI
in March 2004 at MILF camps in Mindanao. JI instructors directed this
training, which focused on demolition, explosives and weapons (kital
jihad), under the protection of the MILF.103 Top JI operatives in the
Philippines, such as Fathur Roman Al Ghozi, Taufiq Refqi, Rohmat (alias
Zaki), and Zulikpli, maintained relationships with Santos and the RSM.
When the Philippine authorities arrested Refqi in Cotabato City in 2003,
they recovered documents linking Santos and the RSM to JI-planned
bombing operations in various locations throughout the Philippines. Zaki,
another well known JI operative in the Philippines, was the primary
instructor of RSM members in the four-month explosives and demolition
training in Mount Cararao, an MLF camp located in the boundary of the
province of Lanao del Sur and Maguindanao in the Southern
Philippines.104
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Ideological formation
RSM drew on a well established tradition in the development of its ideology,
taping the knowledge gained in higher education by Nur Misuari, Hashim
Salamat and Abdurajak Janjalani. The MNLF founder Nur Misuari studied at
the University of the Philippines during the time when student activism
reached its peak in the fight against the Marcos administration.105 He
received a government scholarship through the Commission on National
Integration (CNI), a programme aimed at providing quality education to
young and deserving Muslim students. While studying in Manila, he
encountered a strong anti-Muslim culture, which contributed to the develop-
ment of his frustration with existing Christian-dominated institutions.106 His
experience was not an isolated one; McKenna observes that ‘by 1968, the CNI
scholarship program had unintentionally created a group of young Muslim
intellectuals schooled in political activism’.107 Hashim Salamat received a
scholarship in the Middle East at the Al-Azhar University in Egypt, where he
came under the influence of the ideas of Muslim Brotherhood leader Sayed
Qutb, considered by many analysts to be the most influential radical Islamist
thinker of the 20th century.108 Contemporaries of his at the University in
Cairo, such as Burhanuddin Rabanni, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf and prominent
mujahedeen leaders from the Soviet–Afghan war109 contributed to his
ideological formation as well.
Abdurajak Janjalani’s religious training in Libya in 1988, his subsequent
participation in the Soviet–Afghan war and his work with ASG helped form
RSM’s ideological goals.110 Both ASG and RSM share similar objectives. While
ASG is seeking to establish an independent Islamic state in the Southern
Philippines, RSM is labouring for the same goal in the north.111 Finally,
Ahmed Santos and Ruben ‘Omar’ Lavilla are not without educational
resources themselves. Both received educational training in the Middle East.
Lavilla is a graduate of the Islamic University of Medina, where he
specialised in figh (Islamic jurisprudence), and Santos underwent the Saudi
daawa activity conducted by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments,
Propagation and Guidance.
Framing the movement
As noted above, social movements generally do not expect that all potential
members will have a formal education adequate for fully understanding the
group’s ideology. In order to overcome this obstacle, leaders reduce their
message to generalised ideological snippets that are easily repeated
and resonate with a group’s target audience.112 This is evident in RSM’s
continued reference to issues of ‘ancestral domain’, ‘self determination’ and
‘reverts’ (rather than converts) that help it frame its cause in the eyes of
potential recruits. In addition, RSM draws its name from Rajah Solaiman, a
Filipino Muslim ruler of Manila before the Spanish conquest in the 15th
century, who many believe to be a grandson of the Sultan of Brunei and a
scion of the Bornean dynasty, in order to emphasise its connection with
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the past.113 This choice is not without irony according to Professor Banlaoi,
who observes, ‘Rajah Solaiman was a Spanish collaborator during the
Spanish period . . . Thus, organizing a Muslim liberation movement in his
honor is an apparent contradiction.’114 However, as Robinson notes, it is not
uncommon for movement frames to be historically inaccurate or to
contradict one another.115 Most social movement participants are not
historical scholars; what is important is whether the frame strikes a chord,
not whether it accurately captures historic or present reality. Thus, by
constructing a narrative of rebellion imagined upon a historic figure, Ahmed
Santos exhibited a keen understanding of what was needed to foment discord
in Philippine society.
Conclusion
Just after midnight on 27 February 2004 3.6 kilograms of dynamite hidden
inside a television and placed in a box exploded onboard theMV Super Ferry
14. This Philippine-registered passenger ship regularly carried hundreds of
passengers from Manila to Davao City in the Southern Philippines. The
explosion set the passenger ship afire, and caused 416 casualties (116 dead,
300 injured).116 Even though the Abu Sayyaf Group immediately claimed the
incident, Philippine authorities later learned that the ferry incident was a
joint operation conducted by combined elements of the ASG and RSM.117 A
year later, on 14 February 2005, RSM struck again, with simultaneous
bombings in three major Philippine cities. These incidents, known collectively
as the ‘Valentine’s Day bombing’, occurred in Makati Central Business
District in Metro Manila, and at Davao City and General Santos City (both
in the Southern Philippines). The attacks, which caused the death of four
people and wounded over 100, showed a sophisticated level of co-ordination
and planning that inspired the state authorities to mount a serious and
sustained response.118 In March 2005 Philippine authorities prevented a
major ASG–RSM terrorist plot in a raid that recovered 10 sacks (600kg) of
explosive materials at an RSM safe house in Quezon City. The terrorists’ plan
was supposedly to be carried out during the Christian Lenten season and it
called for the exploding the bombs in areas frequented by US nationals
throughout Manila.119 The terrorists envisioned that this operation, code-
named ‘Operation Big Bang’, would produce results similar to the Indonesian
Bali bombing. The operation would utilise a ‘truck bomb’ to target the ‘LA
Cafe´’, a popular nightspot in Malate and one of Manila’s tourist districts.120
During his interrogation RSM member Pio De Vera admitted that Ahmed
Santos had asked him to prepare a car bomb with a maximum capacity of
1000 kilos of explosives to bomb a target frequented by foreign nationals. He
further revealed that the operation would be a suicide bombing or a
‘martyrdom operation’ of the RSM.121
From 2005 to 2007 the RSM lost many of its key leaders to intensified police
and military operations, and it did not carry out any activities of significance.
Since the arrest of Ahmed Santos in 2005 the RSM has been forced to focus on
reorganisation and recruitment. However, on 19 October 2007 the RSM
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suddenly re-emerged in the spotlight when its spiritual leader, Ruben ‘Omar’
Lavilla, claimed responsibility for the ‘Glorietta bombing’ in the heart of the
Makati business district in Manila. Even though extensive investigations
ruled out the possibility of a terrorist attack (the explosion was caused by a
gas leak), the RSM was resurrected in the minds of the Filipino people.122
Even if RSM has been effectively degraded or destroyed as a terrorist
organisation, the group and its activities must be considered in terms of both
global and local implications. Viewed from the analytical lens of social
movement theory, the three required elements for the re-emergence RSM (or
its replacement by a new group)—insurgent consciousness, resources and
political opportunities—all remain largely unchanged. Indeed, the continuing
emergence of the so-called ‘global Jihad’ provides solid evidence that an
Islamist insurgent consciousness has solidified itself globally in the years
following the 9/11 attacks in the USA. Thus, we concur with analysts
Douglas Borer and Mark T Berger who have observed:
Among other things, what we are witnessing today is a visceral, highly
politicized faith-based reaction to globalization and the crisis of the nation-
state system. ‘Genuinely existing’ liberal capitalism has pushed into every
corner of the globe, bringing goods, services, ideas, images, and behaviors into
the homes of people of all cultures. Indeed, the ‘Western’ proponents of
globalization have often argued that such a transformation would bring people
together by showing them that all humans are essentially the same. However,
globalization has also been a significant force in the weakening of nation-states
and has also compounded state failure, or state collapse, in many cases.123
Inside the Philippines, on the southernmost islands (Basilan, Jolo and
Mindanao) the Moro-Islamic struggle has sustained itself for nearly a half
century and, with the arrival of RSM, it is clear that its narrative of grievance
has now expanded to the northern islands. However, this internal expansion
of the Moro struggle has been made possible primarily by the unforeseen
creation of a resource base for human and financial capital. In this case the
basic resources required for rebellion (people and money) are the
consequences of the decision made by the Marcos government to enter
the global labour market in the 1970s. Many Filipinos now embrace Islam in
the Middle East and express their faith organisationally back home in the
structures of Balik Islam; a select few, like Ahmed Santos, become radicalised
and turn to violence. Most interestingly, it is through this very ideological
process that the tangible financial resources required for any viable social
movement become obtainable. Herein lies the true and somewhat hidden
power of zakat—one of the five pillars of Islam—which requires all the
world’s Muslims to give part of their wealth to the poor. Inevitably, as global
capitalism blithely and blindly expands, more and more energy is required,
making the owners of the world’s primary energy resource (petroleum) very
rich. Thus global Islam in general, Balik Islam in particular, and RSM in
specific, are all able to tap into a huge and growing pool of zakat-generated
venture capital that will sustain and grow their operations—be they peaceful
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or deadly. It must be noted that it is also this very process of ‘democracy
promotion’ and development through global capitalism that is producing
social and economic vulnerabilities (eg unemployment, under-employment
and wretched working conditions in a context of declining welfare and
redistributive politics). Our example highlights the transnational context and
the social and political implications of development through inequality;
wealth accumulation (for some) obtained through labour insecurities (for
others) leads in this case to the (re)production of wider social and political
risk.
Finally, to end this contribution we must address the core question of
political opportunities. Herein lies the realm where governments and
policy makers have the greatest capacity to act, but not in ways that
might further exacerbate crises of social and political legitimacy.
Democratic rule does not imply or place emphasis on the latter (rule),
but rather on the former (democracy), implying substantive democratic
participation in more ‘inclusive’ rather than exclusionary social and
political relations. While it is true that the government of the Philippines
could drastically alter the OFW programme, the idea of eliminating it
entirely is simply a non-viable option in the minds of present decision
makers. Certainly the raw materials that generate both BIM and RSM
would dry up if the OFW programme were eliminated, but when the much-
needed remittances dried up, the negative economic cost to the country
would generate many more problems (taking us back to the contradictions
of capitalist development). However, upon being asked about more closely
monitoring and controlling the OFW, a most curious and compelling
‘Achilles heel’ was exposed: the fundamental right of religious freedom
that is a hallmark of Philippine democracy.
At this late point in our contribution, other than to acknowledge their
existence, we will refrain from entering into debates over whether the
Philippines is an ‘oligarchic democracy’, a ‘cacique democracy’, a ‘failed
democracy’, a ‘Semi democracy’ or any other such classification that one
might find in the democracy literature. Our empirical observation on
Philippine democracy is this: all of the dozen or so government and military
officials that we interviewed in 2008 agreed that any attempt to gather
religious data on overseas workers, or to track people based on their beliefs,
would be seen by most Filipinos as unconstitutional, and amounts to a ‘no-
go zone’ for government and defence officials. As such, even though it is
perfectly fine and legal for an autocratic theocracy such as Saudi Arabia to
spend government money on sermonising Islam in the Philippines, as officials
in Manila see it, it is neither fine nor legal for the Philippine government to
do anything about Saudi proselytising. As a result, Balik Islam is likely to
continue to thrive in the Philippines, and its violent branches, such as RSM
may be inevitable.
What then can the Philippine government do? It is clear from our analysis
that the RSM drew heavily on both technical and operational support
provided by Islamist militants based in the southern Philippines. The locus of
that struggle is Mindanao, and therefore, what the Philippine government
THE RISE OF BALIK ISLAM IN THE PHILIPPINES
199
can do is to re-energise its efforts to make peace with the important
stakeholders in the Moro conflict. However, that is easier said than done.
Most recently, in August 2008, after years of intermittent war and various
internationally led conflict-resolution endeavours, the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines and the MILF signed an extensive Memorandum
of Understanding (MOU) that, if implemented would have brought peace
between the two.124 However, this agreement, which resolved the issues of
land rights and ancestral domain—the key source of Islamic Moro grievances
against the state—was immediately challenged by a group of non-Muslims
(Christians make up the majority of citizens on Mindanao) as being
unconstitutional. Their petition to the Philippine Supreme Court resulted in
an injunction being placed on any further government action pending a
constitutional review of the MOU. This legal action, which may seem to an
outside observer to illustrate of the ebb and flow of democratic governance, is
much more than that to the participants. For MILF’s militants this was
Philippine ‘democracy revealing its evil head’ and, as a result, armed clashes
have once again broken out on Mindanao, resulting in almost 200 new deaths
and well over 300 000 displaced people.125
From the perspective of Ahmed Santos and RSM’s other radical Islamists,
the court injunction may have been signed by the hand of a human judge, but
the divine hand of Allah was at work. As such, at least temporarily, by not
sorting out the constitutional requirements before signing the MOU, the
Philippine government seems to have snatched defeat from the jaws of
victory against the long-running Islamist insurgency. In doing so, the renewal
of war on Mindanao has created a new political opportunity for the revival of
RSM’s more radical vision for Philippine society, and has provided the final
requirement prescribed by social movement theory. When this observation is
placed within the wider context of a development logic that displaces (in this
case through what is often referred to as ‘migrant’ labour), the crisis of
conflict and violence—without being reductive—it would appear as part of a
wider crisis of development.
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